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Abstract
Combining the perspectives of population ecology and the institutional school, this
article examines the influence of private sector development on the performances of
private enterprises in different provinces of China. The analysis shows that rapid growth
of the private sector has a negative impact on the performance of private enterprises in
provinces with a well-developed private sector, whereas it has a positive impact on
private firm performance in provinces with a less-developed private sector. We
argue that the former finding is largely due to the competitive mechanism in firms’
environment, and the latter to the legitimacy mechanism. Further analysis also
shows that young and small private enterprises benefit more in a rapidly growing
private sector. In doing so, this article contributes to population ecology theoretically
and methodologically; it also qualifies “the liability of newness.”
Keywords: Population ecology, Institutional school, Legitimacy mechanism, Competitive
mechanism, Private sector development, Performance of private enterprises
Background
One of the core assumptions in organizational sociology is that organizational environ-
ment is vague and ever changing (Fligstein and Dauter 2007; Zhou 2003). Related re-
search in population ecology focuses on the influence of the technical environment on
organizational form and survival rate (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Haveman and Rao
1997), while the institutional school explores how institutional factors, such as social
norms, recognition, and legitimacy, shape the structure and behaviors of organizations
(Meyer and Scott 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Gao 2008; Guo et al. 2007). Such
research either observes one organizational form for a long time to explore how it
evolves or examines how organizations form their structure and behave under institu-
tional constraints. Little attention has been paid to the relationship between the speed
of institutional change and firm performance. On the other front, organizational
scholars studying transition economies examine the relationship between institutions
and firm performance mainly through two angles. One focuses on organizational
efforts in overcoming institutional obstacles; the other compares firm performance
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under different institutional environments. This article explores how the speed of insti-
tutional change affects firm performance. The institutional environment can be stable
or transitional, changing at a slow or fast pace (Roland 2004). Different speeds of
change can affect firm performance, and this influence may vary across industry sectors
and regions. Previous research has shown that the institutional environment influences
performances of firms and well-developed market conditions improve firm perform-
ance (Xin & Pearce 1996; Peng 2000; Nee 1992; Li et al. 2008). The existing literature
mostly focuses on the comparison of static institutions; however, it overlooks how the
changing institutional environments affect the performance of enterprises. For example,
institutions with a low but fast-growing level of marketization may be more helpful to
the performance of enterprises than those with a high but stable level of marketization.
Thus, the static comparisons in previous research have failed to explicate the effect of
changing environments on enterprises’ performance. Zhou and Zhao (2009) point out
that Chinese social sciences are still poor in applying organization theories and models
in the study of organizations and the dialog with organization studies in the West.
This paper combines the perspectives of population ecology and the institutional
school and explores how the developmental pace of private economy across Chinese
provinces impacts the performance of private enterprises.
Population ecology
According to population ecology, organizations in new forms have high death rates and
low survival rates in the early stage because of the small number of organizations and
hence the low level of legitimacy. As the number of new organizations grows, the legit-
imacy of new organizations gradually increases, which enhances the survival rate and
decreases the mortality rate of organizations. However, as the number of organization
crosses a threshold, the legitimacy mechanism is replaced by the competition mechan-
ism since organizations do not have to worry about legitimacy. On the contrary, the in-
creasingly intensive competition for resources and markets due to the growing number
of organizations results in the rise of the mortality rate and the decline of an organiza-
tion’s chances for survival (Hannan and Freeman 1977). Hannan and Freeman (1987)
find that the founding rates of American labor unions from 1836 to 1985 formed an
inverted U-shaped curve, while the dissolution rates fit a U-shaped curve (Hannan and
Freeman 1988). According to Carroll and Delacroix (1982), the newspaper industries in
Argentina (1800–1900) and Ireland (1800–1970) both have U-shaped death rates and
inverted U-shaped survival rates.
As one of the major schools in sociology, population ecology has particular contribu-
tions and insights, but there are still some deficiencies. First, most of the studies in this
field apply event history analysis to examine the survival, founding, and death rates of
organizations, but little attention has been paid to organizational performance (Carroll
and Delacroix 1982; Freeman et al. 1983; Hannan 2005; Hannan & Freeman 1987,
1988; Tucker et al. 1984). The only exception here is Carroll and Huo’s work (1986) on
the influence of institutional factors on newspaper circulation. In this paper, institu-
tional environment variables include economic peak and trough years, industrial estab-
lishments, presidential election years, and political turmoil; among which, only political
turmoil is influential in the way that it affects the founding and death of newspapers
and has little impact on newspaper circulation.
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Second, most studies in population ecology focus on the long-term pattern of an
organization form under a particular social and institutional environment, but relatively
less attention has been paid to regional differences within the same society. Classic
works by Hannan (2005) and others consider the country to be the boundary of
competition for organizations, while Zuker (1989) points out that organizations may
compete for resources in smaller regions. Some scholars are also aware of the complex
effects of regional resources and the environment on organizations (Carroll and Wade
1991; Hannan and Carroll 1992; Lomi 1995). For example, Baum and Mezias find that
in Manhattan, the stronger the local competition for size, price, and location, the higher
the death rates of hotels. Lomi (1995) documents that from 1964 to 1988, differences
existed across 13 regions in Italy in terms of the competition and legitimacy mecha-
nisms among rural cooperative banks. However, regional comparative studies are rare
in population ecology and are limited to a single industry.
A distinguishing feature of population ecology is the analysis of organizational dens-
ity, measured by the number of organizations through event history analysis (Hannan
2005). Because of its methodology, it is hard for population ecology to break through
after the rapid development from the late 1970s to the 1990s. However, the density of
an organization can only reflect the environment within the population; such measure-
ment is too narrow since it considers organizational survival and competition to be
confined within the population (often within an industry in empirical research), but
ignores the competition between different forms of organizations (Zucker 1989). In line
with Zucker, we argue that it is problematic to use the number of organizations to
measure organizational density because it lacks comparison with other forms of organi-
zations. For example, an increase by a small number for a certain organization in a very
small economy and slowly developing society or region may imply significantly
improvement in legitimacy; however, such an increase in a large economy and rapidly
developing society or region may not imply an improvement in legitimacy as opposed
to other organizational forms, particularly rival forms. We therefore propose that
organizational density should be measured by the proportion of certain types of organi-
zations scaled by the total economy. This method better captures the competition
between different forms of organizations.
The institutional school and population ecology revisited
The institutional school and population ecology arose at almost the same time. The
institutional school focuses on social norms, standards, cognition, and culture, while
population ecology pays more attention to the technical environment. Each of the two
schools has absorbed merits from and critiqued the other (Baum and Powell 1995;
Carroll and Huo 1986). Legitimacy, which has been widely discussed in both schools, is
treated as an important institutional factor in the institutional school (Liu and Tian
2009; Yang 2011), and most studies examine how different kinds of legitimacy influence
organizations. However, legitimacy is considered a technical factor that is a function of
organization density in population ecology, and scholars have mainly focused on how
organizational density affects the survival or death of organizations. Moreover,
researchers in the institutional school believe that legitimacy in population ecology is
cognitive legitimacy that ignores the support from the external environment, which is
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known as sociopolitical legitimacy (Baum and Powell 1995; Singh et al. 1986; Suchman
1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). Zucker (1989) points out that population ecology
also lacks a proper measurement of legitimacy and obtrusively treats organization dens-
ity as equivalent to legitimacy. Baum and Powell (1995) further critique that population
ecology has conflated organizational density with legitimacy in the sense that the
former appears to be the proxy but also as the process for the latter. In addition, insti-
tutional theorists argue that historical contexts are vital for organizational legitimacy,
and therefore, population ecology has the problem of ahistoricism due to its lack of
social contexts (Zucker 1989; Baum and Powell 1995).
The existing literature in the institutional school focuses on the causes and mecha-
nisms for institutional changes and how these changes shape organizations’ structures
and behaviors. A more macro analysis of institutional change examines political and
economic change at national level. For example, China’s gradual transition is consid-
ered to be more successful than the "shock therapy" in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Scholars have noted the pace of institutional change; Roland proposes
the classification of institutions into "slow-moving" and "fast-moving" institutions
(Roland 2004). However, it is still unclear how the changing pace of institutions
influences organizations’ performance and behavior.
This paper applies the concepts and mechanisms in population ecology to explore
how the changing pace of institutions affects organizational performance. First, we
argue that organizational density, measured by the proportion of market share, employ-
ment, and investment in the total economy, reflects the developmental level of this type
of organization as well as its cognitive legitimacy, which is also an important institu-
tional factor. Caroll and Huo (1986) argue that the institutional environment includes
not only rules and beliefs but also market size, shape, condition, and stability. There-
fore, organizational density is a good measurement of the developmental level and in-
stitutional environment of organizations. The pace of change in organizational density
during a certain period reflects the process of legitimacy, that is, the changing pace of
the institutional environment. When organizational density or the level of organizational
development is low, the legitimacy mechanism determines organizational performance
and rapid development of organizational density is beneficial. When organizational dens-
ity is high, which indicates a high level of organizational development, the legitimacy
mechanism is replaced by competition mechanism, and the rapid development of
organizational density is harmful to organizational performance. Second, though
population ecology theorists usually contend that competitive environments are
country specific, some acknowledge that institutional environments may be different
across regions within a country. Carroll and Huo (1986) argue that institutional
factors such as market size, shape, and condition may vary across regions, and such
variation may influence organization behavior. Therefore, for a certain type of
organization, its developmental level and legitimacy and the competitive environment
may be different in different regions of the same country. The legitimacy mechanism
dominates in regions with low organizational density, whereas the competition
mechanism dominates in places with high organizational density. Finally, social and
historical contexts should be taken into account in the analysis of organizations’
institutional environment since the legitimacy of organizations comes partially from
sociopolitical support.
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Drawing on the theoretical framework discussed previously, our paper explores how
the developmental level and pace of the private economy affect private enterprises’
performance. In addition, this paper further explores the interaction effects between
the fast-changing pace and corporate characteristics, including firm size and firm age.
The development of private sectors and regional development in China
One of the most important factors in the development of the Chinese private economy
is legitimacy. In the socialist movement in the 1950s, the private economy was com-
pletely nationalized due to socialist ideology. The private economy was long regarded
as the symbol of capitalism that had to be eliminated in China. In the early stage of
reform, the relatively open policy on the coast allowed the revival of private enterprise.
Private enterprises could not register as private entities but instead had to register
under other public entities, which is known as wearing a “red hat” for the sake of
legitimacy. China’s first legislation on private enterprises, the Provisional Regulation of
Wenzhou Private Enterprises, was passed in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, in 1987. Drawing on
the practice in Wenzhou, in 1988, the National People's Congress promulgated the
Provisional Regulation of Private Enterprises, which legitimized the existence of private
enterprises throughout the country. The 14th Chinese Communist Party (CCP here-
after) Congress further assured the legal status of private enterprises in 1992. Then in
the 16th CCP Congress, private enterprise owners were allowed to join the CCP, which
was viewed as a major step in enhancing the legitimacy of the private economy.
However, private enterprises today still suffer from discrimination in industry entry,
financing, and many other aspects and have to seek support through social networks or
political connections (Li et al. 2008; Peng 2000). These issues indicate the vital import-
ance of legitimacy for the development of private enterprises.
The historical development of private enterprises is a step development across
regions in China. Coastal areas enjoyed rapid development of the private economy in
the 1980s and 1990s due to increased autonomy in policies. Since the middle of the
1990s, the Chinese government has provided more support for inland areas, such as
the projects of the "Great Western Expansion" in 1999, the "Northeast Revitalization"
in 2003, and the "Rise of Central China" in 2005. To attract coastal private enterprises,
the middle and western regions provided more favorable policies on taxes, finance, and
land use than the coastal regions did. In contrast, after about two decades of rapid
development, the coastal private enterprises decreasingly contributed to the coastal
economy due to their relatively smaller size and more investment of labor and land but
less added value. The GDP-oriented coastal governments increasingly provided more
support for large and capital-intensive enterprises, while the local private enterprises
experienced more and more difficulty in obtaining capital and land. This policy is
known as "vacating the cage to change birds" (teng long huan niao). Since 2000, this
policy has been implemented to some degree in many coastal provinces (Zheng and
Tong 2010). In the last 10 years, a large number of private enterprises have moved
from regions with an advanced private economy to those with a relatively backward
private economy. For example, the garment industry in the southeast moved to Henan,
the footwear industry moved from Wenzhou to Chongqing, and glasses businesses
moved from Wenzhou to Jiangxi.
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Many studies in spatial economics used data from before 2002, and their findings sug-
gest that the development of the private economy in the coastal regions is much better
than that in the inner provinces (Fan and Sun 2008). However, recent research has shown
that the gap between coastal and inland areas has declined since 2004 (Fan and Sun 2008;
Xu and Li 2006; Chan and Wang 2008). The dynamic development of China’s private
economy across regions provides a good opportunity to explore the causes and mecha-
nisms in China’s economy transition and to test the hypotheses presented below.
Hypotheses
The developmental pace of private sectors and the performance of private enterprises
According to population ecology, the death rate is high for new organizations in the
initial stage due to their small number or density and low legitimacy in the market. As
the number of organization increases, their legitimacy will improve. Consequently, the
mortality rates will decrease, and the survival rates and founding rates will rise.
However, when the organizational number or density crosses a threshold, the legitim-
acy mechanism will be replaced by the competition mechanism, that is, the growing
number of organizations will intensify the competition for resources and markets and
will thus impede founding rates and lead to a rise in death rates.
We incorporated population ecology into the institutional analysis and offer the
following propositions: when organizational density is low, the rapid development of orga-
nizations is beneficial for organizational performance driven by the legitimacy mechanism;
and when organizational density is high, the rapid development of organizations is harm-
ful for organizational performance driven by the competition mechanism. Some studies of
population ecology show that the mechanisms of competition and legitimacy vary across
regions (Baum and Mezias 1992; Lomi 1995). We therefore argue that in provinces with a
relatively advanced private economy, the legitimacy of private enterprises is high. The
competition mechanism thus determines the development of private enterprises, and the
growth of the private economy will inhibit the performance of private enterprises. In
contrast, the legitimacy mechanism dominates in provinces with a relatively backward
private economy. The rapid development of private enterprises means the improvement
of legitimacy; more importantly, legitimacy also comes partially from governmental sup-
port, which is helpful for private enterprises in obtaining resources, expanding markets,
and consequently improving performance. Thus, we can draw the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The rapid development of the private economy has a negative effect on the
performance of private enterprises in provinces with a high level of private economy and a
positive effect on the performance of those in provinces with a low level of private economy.
The developmental pace of private sectors: firm size and performance of private enterprises
The existing literature shows that large enterprises show better performance because
their diversification, scale economy, and formal procedures make operations and man-
agement more effective (Penrose 1995). Opponents argue that the size of an enterprise
has something to do with market power (Shepherd 1986), and increase of market
power will grow X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1976). That is, when the market power
of a large enterprise grows into a monopoly, the loose management will discourage
innovation and consequently decrease efficiency. Most of these studies focus on
stable environments.
Chen and Zheng The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2015) 2:16 Page 6 of 17
Population ecology offers a different perspective and argues that the growth of
organizational size will increase structural inertia, which will result in the organization’s
slow adaptation to the environment. Generally speaking, structural inertia is high for
large enterprises due to their large size, standard routines, stability, and reliability
(Hannan and Freeman 1984). In contrast, small enterprises are less constrained by
structural inertia (Miller et al. 1982). Studies also document that small enterprises
benefit more in turbulent environments than in stable environments (Covin and Slevin
1989), and the innovation strategy has a stronger positive effect on small enterprises in
turbulent environments. We argue that small enterprises show better performance in fast-
changing environments due to their lower level of structural inertia and more flexible adap-
tation in product and market strategy; in contrast, large enterprises find it more difficult to
adapt to fast-changing environments, constrained by their structural inertia and high cost
of coordination among various departments. We thus draw the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The rapid development of the private economy is more beneficial to the
performance of small private enterprises than that of large enterprises.
The developmental pace of private sectors: age and performance of private enterprises
Stinchcombe (1965) argues that new organizations suffer from the "liability of
newness" because they have to learn new roles as social actors and coordinate new
roles of employees and their legitimacy is low. New organizations tend to lose the
competition with existing organizations and have high death rates, while old enter-
prises gain their advantage from stability and reliability (Hannan and Freeman
1984). Numerous studies reveal the negative relationship between firm age and
firm’s mortality rates. For example, Freeman et al. (1983) document that labor
unions and the semi-conductor industry have some degree of the liability of
newness. Carroll and Delacroix (1982) find that older newspapers are less likely to
die; Carroll (1985) points out that liability of newness also exists in the retail,
wholesale, and manufacturing industries. However, Singh et al. (1986) offers a
different perspective, arguing that the liability of newness is due less to the need
for internal coordination within new organizations but more to the lack of institu-
tional support. Their research on volunteer organizations in Toronto (1970–1980)
demonstrates that most internal changes are unrelated to death rates except for a
change in CEO, whereas external legitimacy significantly depresses mortality rates.
The effect of external legitimacy is measured by the acquisition of a community
directory listing, the acquisition of a charitable registration number, and board size
at birth, and their findings suggest that institutional support can make up for the
liability of newness. In addition, some studies show that owing to inertia and petri-
faction, old enterprises lack the flexibility to adapt to the fast-changing market and
thus have poorer performance than new enterprises (Marshall 1920).
When the private economy grows rapidly, this leads to better institutional support
for private enterprises, which can offset the effect of the liability of newness. Mean-
while, the flexibility of new enterprises leads them to adapt to rapid changes in the
market. We therefore draw the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Rapid development of the private economy is more beneficial to the
performance of new private enterprises than that of old private enterprises.
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Methods
Sample and data source
The data in this study comes from the 2008 national survey of private enterprises,
which was carried out by the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party
of China Central Committee, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the China Private Economy
Research Institute. This survey covers private enterprises from 31 provinces in China
across industries, stages, and sizes. The sample has 1607 observations with complete
information after the deletion of missing values.
Variables and models
The dependent variable in this paper is the performance of private enterprises. We used
ROE, return on equity, to measure an enterprise’s performance. The logarithm of ROE
is used in the regression model due to the skewed distribution of ROE. We also used
ROA, return on assets, to perform the robustness test.
The major independent variable in this paper is the developmental pace of the private
economy, in other words, the growth rate of the private economy’s density. Our previ-
ous discussion shows that measuring organizational density through the number of
organizations results in bias. Zucker critiques Hannan and Carroll’s measurement
(1989) and argues that “newspapers may at one stage be competing within population
(with other newspapers), but at a later stage be competing for both consumers and ad-
vertisers with radio, news magazines, and television news, none of which is entered into
density as measured by Carroll and Hannan” (Zucker 1989, 543). It is therefore more
appropriate to use the proportion of the population scaled by the total economy,
including rival populations. For example, in many sectors, Chinese private enterprises
also compete with state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises, and foreign
enterprises. China’s economy has grown rapidly and now ranks second in the world;
the proportion of the private economy in the national economy as the measurement of
the density or development level of private economy will thus better capture the
relationship between the density and legitimacy of private economy. Unlike private
enterprises in the West, in China, legitimacy is vital for the survival and development
of private enterprises (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2001). Furthermore, the measurement of
organizational density in our paper is province specific, based on the following rational-
ities. First, our method is inspired by the few studies on organizational competition
driven by regional density (Baum and Mezias 1992; Lomi 1995). Second, scholars have
extensively explored the local protectionism across provinces in China and found that
local protectionism is rampant and interprovincial trade barriers are severe (Zhou Zhou
2004; Young 2000; Bai et al. 2004). According to Sandra Poncet, a French economist,
“the average tariff between Chinese provinces is higher than that between the states in
European Union, and the number of local goods purchased by Chinese consumers is
21 times that of goods made in other provinces” (Hu and Zhang 2005, 103). This
clearly indicates that the competition between economic organizations mainly occurs
within the provincial boundary.
First, we created a development index of the private economy. We partially borrowed
methods from other scholars (Fan et al. 2010; Li et al. 2008); selected the three
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dimensions of investments, sales, and urban employment from the China’s Statistics
Yearbooks from 2006 to 2008; and then calculated the proportion of the private economy
within the total economy. The development index of the private economy is the
arithmetic average of the three proportions.
Second, we used the percentage of the developmental index in 2007 divided by
that in 2006 to measure the developmental pace of the private economy. We
further used the median of the developmental pace and classified the country into
fast-growing and slow-growing regions. The developmental indexes and growth
rates in 2006 and 2007 are shown in Table 1.1
Provinces with a high level of private economy such as Jiangsu, Shandong, or
Guangdong have a much slower growth rate than provinces with a lower level.
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Beijing actually have a negative growth rate, while Yunnan,
Gansu, Anhui, Neimenggu, and Chongqing, where the private economy is at a
relatively low level, rank at the top in growth rate. We also adopted continuous
growth rate in the analysis, and the results are consistent with those of the
dummy variable of growth rate.
We therefore used the following equation to test our hypotheses:
Private enerprise performance ¼ β0 þ β1 growth rate þ β2 growth rate
 development indexþ Xδ þ ε
ð1Þ
In addition, we also investigated the influence of the size and age of an enter-
prise on its performance. We took the logarithm of the number of employees by
the end of 2006 to measure enterprise size, while enterprise age is calculated from
the founding year to 2007. All enterprises in the sample were registered in 2006
or before.
Table 1 Developmental indexes and growth rates for private economy in 2006 and 2007
Province 2006 2007 Speed Province 2006 2007 Speed
Yunnan 15.80 19.07 20.73 Hebei 18.98 20.62 8.66
Gansu 12.02 14.05 16.87 Shaanxi 9.61 10.41 8.33
Hainan 21.04 24.46 16.23 Jiangxi 24.13 26.12 8.22
Anhui 20.18 23.36 15.76 Jiangsu 35.08 37.86 7.93
Chongqing 21.79 25.12 15.27 Shandong 25.59 27.62 7.90
Neimenggu 15.81 18.16 14.88 Sichuan 17.33 18.52 6.87
Zhejiang 23.08 26.26 13.79 Guangxi 16.48 17.58 6.71
Henan 17.51 19.85 13.37 Shanxi 14.45 15.32 6.06
Heilongjiang 12.91 14.63 13.30 Ningxia 16.51 17.32 4.90
Fujian 23.54 26.55 12.79 Xinjiang 10.69 11.18 4.62
Tibet 13.43 15.12 12.58 Hunan 18.81 19.55 3.95
Jilin 13.92 15.53 11.64 Qinghai 20.63 21.04 1.94
Liaoning 19.52 21.76 11.49 Shanghai 28.42 27.75 −2.36
Hubei 20.57 22.84 11.01 Tianjin 19.33 18.70 −3.28
Guizhou 16.57 18.28 10.30 Beijing 13.78 13.15 −4.54
Guangdong 22.19 24.44 10.14
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We used Eq. (2) to analyze the interactive effect between enterprise size and the
growth rate of private economy and Eq. (3) for the interactive effect between enterprise
age and the growth rate.
Private enerprise performance ¼ β0 þ β1  growth rate þ β2 fast growth
 sizeþ Xδ þ ε:
ð2Þ
Private enerprise performance ¼ β0 þ β1  growth rate þ β2 fast growth
 ageþ Xδ þ ε:
ð3Þ
Finally, our models controlled several sets of variables. The first is corporate var-
iables, including industry, assets (log-transformed), leverage, and the size of man-
agement. The second set is individual variables, including age, gender, education,
and CCP membership (Li 1998) of private entrepreneurs. The last is the provincial
economic development measured by GDP (log-transformed). The data originally
classified the industry into nineteen industries; however, since the number of enter-
prises in some of the industries is too small, we classified the industries into six
groups: (1) agriculture and mining; (2) manufacturing and electric power; (3) con-
struction and transportation; (4) information, technology, finance, and real estate;
(5) sales; and (6) other industries. After the reclassification, each group had more
than 100 enterprises, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Summary of statistics of key variables
Variables Obs. Average SD Min Max
ROE 1607 0.424 1.407 0 26.75
ROE (log) 1607 −2.151 1.55 −8.78 3.287
Total assets (10,000) 1607 2791.747 9091.0.236 2 205,000
Total assets (log) 1607 6.319 1.879 0.693 12.231
Enterprise size 1607 207.512 573.863 2 12,000
Enterprise size (log) 1607 4.142 1.515 0.693 9.393
Financial leverage 1607 0.240 0.262 0 0.993
Enterprise age (year) 1607 7.828 4.782 1 27
Management size 1607 0.163 0.105 0.01 0.5
Industry
Agriculture and mining 1607 0.090 0.286 0 1
Manufacture and power 1607 0.496 0.500 0 1
Construction and transportation 1607 0.094 0.292 0 1
Information, finance, and real estate 1607 0.063 0.244 0 1
Sales 1607 0.166 0.372 0 1
Male 1607 0.856 0.351 0 1
Age 1607 44.803 8.234 18 79
Education level (year) 1607 14.210 2.799 6 19
CCP membership 1607 0.366 0.482 0 1
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Results
The mean of ROE was 0.42, private enterprises hire 207 employees on average, the
average proportion of management within all employees was 16.3 %, and the average
age of all enterprises in 2007 was 7.8 years. Males composed 85.6 % of all business
owners, and 36.6 % were CCP members. The average age of business owners was
45 years old, while the average education was 14 years.
According to Table 3, the correlation coefficient between the main variables is below
0.3, and the VIF in the regression model with no interaction terms is 1.78; this indicates
no multicollinearity problem, and it is thus appropriate to use OLS regression.2
Model 1 in Table 4, which contains no interactive effects, shows that the developmental
index of private economy in 1 year (2006) has a significant positive effect on the perform-
ance of private enterprises in the following year (2007), while the growth rate of private
economy has no influence on the performance of private firms. A high level of private
economy development in a province thus promotes the performance of local private enter-
prises, and the increasing pace has nothing to do with the performance of private firms.
Model 2 focuses on the interaction between the level of private economic development
and the growth rate. Rapid growth in private economy clearly has a negative impact on the
performance of private enterprises in provinces with a high level of private economy, and
the effect is highly significant. This indicates that competition is intensive in provinces with
a high level of private economy, and further development will inhibit the performance of
private enterprise. In contrast, in regions with a less-developed private economy, the rise of
the proportion of investments, sales, and employment in the private economy enhances
the cognitive legitimacy of private enterprises; such growth is also supported by
governmental policies, which implies the rise of sociopolitical legitimacy. Both are
beneficial for the performance of private enterprises. The results lend support to
hypothesis 1. Models 3 and 4 examine the influence of enterprise size and age on the
performance of private enterprises. The data in model 3 demonstrates the positive
effect of enterprise size on enterprise performance; however, large size is found to be
detrimental to performance of enterprises when the private economy is growing
rapidly, and the negative effect is statistically significant (p < 0.05). The results support
hypothesis 2, that is, the advantage of a large scale is weakened in a rapidly changing
economy. The results in model 4 reveal that enterprise age has a positive effect on
enterprise performance, but the effect is negative in rapidly changing environments.
The results lend support to hypothesis 3, that is, the advantage of old enterprises is
weakened in fast-changing institutions. This implies that regions where the private
economy grows rapidly provide more support for private enterprises; new private
enterprises have better institutional support, which helps them overcome the liability
of newness. In addition, new enterprises are more flexible than old enterprises; there-
fore, fast-changing institutions are more beneficial to new enterprises.
We next report the results of control variables. The effect of assets on enterprise
performance is significantly negative, but the effects of management size and leverage
are significantly positive in all models. In terms of industry, the groups of mining/agri-
culture and information/finance/real estate are higher than other industry groups; there
is no discernible difference among the other four industry groups. As to individual
characteristics, the effect of education is significantly positive, and the results are
almost consistent with the findings in the literature. CCP membership is found to have
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Table 3 Pearson correlation of key variables
ROE (log) Asset (log) Enterprise size (log) Leverage Enterprise age Management size Male Age Education CCP
ROE (log) 1.00
Asset (log) −0.16 1.00
Enterprise size (log) 0.09 0.71 1.00
Leverage 0.20 0.29 0.24 1.00
Enterprise age −0.03 0.20 0.18 0.02 1.00
Management size 0.00 −0.26 −0.54 −0.07 −0.13 1.00
Male 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.08 −0.08 1.00
Age −0.08 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.24 −0.11 0.09 1.00
Education 0.05 0.23 0.18 −0.03 −0.07 0.06 0.02 −0.22 1.00














a negative impact on enterprise performance in all models, which differs from the findings
of Li et al. (2008). This difference may come from the growing number of memberships in
the CCP. In Li et al.’s study (2008), 26 % of private entrepreneurs were CCP members,
while in our paper, the proportion is 36.3 %. The reason for such a discrepancy is beyond
the scope of this paper. The results further reveal that provincial GDP in 2006 shows no
impact on the performance of private enterprises.
Finally, ROA was used to test the robustness, and the result is consistent with previ-
ous findings.
Conclusions and discussion
Given the data limitations, our study has some potential deficiencies that need to
be improved in the future. Our data only contains cross-sectional information on
the performance of private enterprises in 2007 and lacks information on enterprise
performance and other relevant information in previous years. An ideal dataset
Table 4 Growth rate of private economy and performance of private enterprises
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
ROE (log)
Asset (log) −0.471**** 0.028 −0.468**** 0.028 −0.472**** 0.028 −0.468**** 0.028
Enterprise size (log) 0.490**** 0.040 0.490**** 0.039 0.530**** 0.044 0.487**** 0.039
Leverage 1.561**** 0.141 1.573**** 0.141 1.561**** 0.141 1.552**** 0.141
Enterprise age 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.322**** 0.095
Management size 1.629**** 0.407 1.601**** 0.406 1.588**** 0.407 1.605**** 0.406
Industry
Agriculture and mining 0.472*** 0.166 0.443*** 0.166 0.471*** 0.166 0.508*** 0.166
Manufacture & power 0.017 0.129 −0.003 0.129 0.009 0.129 0.014 0.129
Construction and
transportation
0.046 0.163 0.040 0.163 0.030 0.163 0.046 0.163
Information, technology,
real estate, and finance
0.400** 0.183 0.391** 0.182 0.408** 0.182 0.387** 0.182
Sales −0.038 0.145 −0.060 0.144 −0.040 0.145 −0.030 0.144
Male 0.094 0.102 0.087 0.102 0.099 0.102 0.088 0.102
Age −0.009# 0.005 −0.009** 0.005 −0.009# 0.005 −0.009** 0.005
Education 0.045**** 0.014 0.045**** 0.014 0.044**** 0.014 0.042*** 0.014
CCP −0.176** 0.078 −0.167** 0.077 −0.175** 0.078 −0.158** 0.078
Provincial GDP (log) 0.014 0.060 -0.082 0.067 0.018 0.060 0.013 0.060
Development index of private
economy in 2006
1.734** 0.687 2.329**** 0.709 1.700** 0.687 2.070*** 0.693
Fast growth of private economy 0.028 0.078 10.044**** 3.028 0.405** 0.206 0.232** 0.098
Development index x fast growth −8.863**** 2.679
Enterprise size x fast growth −0.092** 0.047
Enterprise age x fast growth −0.293**** 0.087
Constant −2.749**** 0.604 −1.983*** 0.645 −2.938**** 0.611 −2.860**** 0.603
Observations 1607 1607 1607 1607
R2 0.209 0.214 0.210 0.214
#p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001 (two-tailed test)
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should contain longitudinal information from 3 to 5 years or an even longer time
period, which would allow for a better test of the causal relationship among vari-
ables. Despite the data limitations, we believe our study contributes to the
literature in the following ways. First, our study reveals that in regions where the
private economy is advanced, the competition mechanism determines the develop-
ment of the private economy and the rapid growth of the private economy intensi-
fies the competition among private enterprises and consequently inhibits the
performance of private enterprises. In contrast, in regions where the private economy is
relatively backward, the cognitive legitimacy of the private economy is relatively low.
However, policy support becomes as strong as and even stronger than in advanced
regions; hence, the improvement of sociopolitical legitimacy promotes the rapid growth of
the private economy. Such improvement has a positive effect on the performance of pri-
vate enterprises. The findings suggest that it may be biased to compare the developmental
level of institutions statistically, and developmental pace should be taken into consider-
ation when we examine how institutional environments impact the survival and perform-
ance of enterprises. In practice, our findings imply that governments could guide and
promote private investment in less-advanced regions. This would allow private enterprises
to obtain higher returns in the micro sense and would also be helpful in decreasing the
gap in regional economies and promoting more equal development across regions in a
macro sense.
Second, our study enriches and advances population ecology theoretically as well as
empirically. Population ecology mainly applies event history analysis to examining the
survival, death, and founding rates of organizations and holds that the enduring pattern
of organizational change is driven by the mechanisms of legitimacy and competition.
However, population ecology is poor in explicating variations in institutional environ-
ments across regions and their effect on organizational performance. Our study reveals
that the two mechanisms can also be applied to explain how institutional environments
in different regions impact the performance of enterprises. Along this line, future stud-
ies can test how the developmental level and pace of a certain industry in different
regions affect the performance of enterprises. In most population ecology studies, the
concept of population refers to industry; our study advances the concept of population
from industry to ownership. Furthermore, our methodology also advances population
ecology. A distinguishing feature of population ecology is the analysis of the survival
and death of organizations through organizational density, measured by the number of
organizations. However, this also constrains the development of population ecology.
We argue that it is plausible to measure the process of legitimacy through the number
of organizations; however, it is biased and particularly overlooks the competition be-
tween different types of organizations and the variation of developmental level and pace
across regions. The small number of organizations in a very small economy may have
high legitimacy; likewise, the growth of a certain type of organization in a rapidly rising
economy may not imply improvement of legitimacy. We therefore believe that it is
more reasonable to measure organizational density through the comprehensive devel-
opmental index of a certain type of organization.
Finally, our study suggests that fast-changing environments are detrimental to large
enterprises; this is consistent with the theory of structural inertia for large enterprises
in population ecology. We further find that fast-changing environments are beneficial
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to young enterprises and makes up for the deficiencies of the liability of newness, which
ignores institutional support.
Endnotes
1An anonymous reviewer suggested we use a longer period of data to measure the
growth rate of private economy. China’s Statistical Yearbooks do not provide information
about the number of private enterprises before 2005; thus, we could only get the average
growth rate up to 3 years. We also used the 3-year average rate in our analysis. The results
are consistent with the findings presented here.
2Although our models contain two levels of variables, that is, enterprise and province,
we did not adopt the hierarchic linear model (HLM) due to two reasons. First, HLM
requires the sample size of the second level to be more than 50 (Hox 2002; Mass and
Hox 2005), while the sample in our study has 31 provinces at the second level. Second,
HLM is usually used in educational studies of students embedded within classes or psy-
chological research on multiple tests of the same individuals. In these classic examples,
students in the same class have strong mutual effects, and the results of multiple tests
on the same individual are highly correlated. This violation of the independent and
identically distributed (IID) requirement in OLS regression calls for the use of HLM.
However, in the study of enterprises located in different provinces, the sampled enter-
prises from the same province do not have strong mutual effects and correlations. In
fact, we refer to similar statistics analysis of enterprises within provinces, all of which
used OLS regressions, such as Li et al. (2008), Du (2015), and Yang (2009).
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